Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3zbMath1282.91063OpenAlexW2043994541MaRDI QIDQ1936340

Irene Valsecchi

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriacheap talkstrategic information transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Professional advice
• The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with Monotone Likelihood Ratio
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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