Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1007/S11424-012-9301-7zbMath1264.91067OpenAlexW2009632478MaRDI QIDQ1936577

Yong Zhao, Yaqiong Wu, Chaoyuan Yue, Xianglin Wu

Publication date: 6 February 2013

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-9301-7

zbMATH Keywords

auctions/biddingbudget constraintsequilibrium bidding strategyhomogenous multiunit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Design techniques (robust design, computer-aided design, etc.) (93B51) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

The changing of common priors in sequential auctions

Cites Work

• A simple model of coalitional bidding
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
• High bids and broke winners

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