A stochastic competitive research and development race where ``winner takes all with lower and upper bounds

DOI10.1007/s10957-012-0066-xzbMath1260.91134OpenAlexW2005892142MaRDI QIDQ1937000

Pelin G. Canbolat, Uriel G. Rothblum, Boaz Golany

Publication date: 11 February 2013

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-012-0066-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaresource allocationglobal optimalityR\&D management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Stochastic Competitive R&D Race Where “Winner Takes All”
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games