Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games

DOI10.1007/s00285-012-0516-yzbMath1259.91024OpenAlexW2066680895WikidataQ51419850 ScholiaQ51419850MaRDI QIDQ1937893

Honglin Yang, Zhanwen Ding, Shuxun Wang

Publication date: 1 February 2013

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-012-0516-y

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionarily stable strategymatrix gamelocal superiorityglobal superiorityinvader strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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