Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0305-7zbMath1274.91172OpenAlexW2014427898MaRDI QIDQ1938825

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 25 February 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0305-7

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functions\(xy\)-based rules\(xy\)-monotonicitybinary rangesgroupstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof ⋮ Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference ⋮ Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity ⋮ Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives ⋮ Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness ⋮ Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice ⋮ The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Cites Work

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• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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