Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0248-4zbMath1274.91010OpenAlexW1979572037MaRDI QIDQ1938830

Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko

Publication date: 25 February 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0905.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

interimoptimal strategiesvalueBayesian equilibriumupper semi-continuitycommon priorex-antelower approximate semi-continuityzero-sum Bayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Continuity Properties of Value Functions in Information Structures for Zero-Sum and General Games and Stochastic Teams

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Payoff continuity in incomplete information games
• Lower hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
• What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?
• Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information
• Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information
• A first course on zero-sum repeated games

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