Strategic analysis of influence peddling

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0340-ZzbMath1274.91091OpenAlexW1974242684MaRDI QIDQ1938831

Seung Han Yoo, Mukul K. Majumdar

Publication date: 25 February 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/11.04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesrepeated gamesrevolving doors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
• The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

This page was built for publication: Strategic analysis of influence peddling