Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
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Publication:1938833
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7zbMath1274.91046OpenAlexW2013562363MaRDI QIDQ1938833
Lars Peter Østerdal, Peter H. Knudsen
Publication date: 25 February 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/32172313/0519.pdf
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