Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

DOI10.1007/s11750-010-0149-5zbMath1262.91029OpenAlexW2062544982MaRDI QIDQ1939062

Bas van Velzen, P. E. M. Borm, Emiliya A. Lazarova

Publication date: 26 February 2013

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0149-5

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycontractscoalitional games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Cites Work

• A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation
• Voting by Committees
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• The Core of an Economy with Production

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