Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2012.11.036zbMath1282.91126OpenAlexW1974149536WikidataQ59818399 ScholiaQ59818399MaRDI QIDQ1939256

Christos Tzamos, Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.11.036

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designfacility location gamesstrategyproof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

Heterogeneous facility location without money ⋮ Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances ⋮ Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions ⋮ Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range ⋮ Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources ⋮ Facility location games with optional preference ⋮ Competition with online and offline demands considering logistics costs based on the Hotelling model ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments

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