On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0335-9zbMath1282.91278OpenAlexW2026552844MaRDI QIDQ1939512

Tim Hellmann

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0335-9

zbMATH Keywords

existenceuniquenessconvexitynetwork formationpairwise stabilitystrategic complements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Related Items

Structural estimation of pairwise stable networks with nonnegative externality, Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, The computation of pairwise stable networks, The optimal multistage effort and contract of VC's joint investment, Competition for the access to and use of information in networks, Sharing market access in buyer-seller networks, A weak law for moments of pairwise stable networks, Pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies with weak link externalities, Evolution of social networks, On the Existence of Pairwise Stable Weighted Networks

Cites Work

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• A note on local spillovers, convexity, and the strategic substitutes property in networks
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• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation