Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3zbMath1282.91045OpenAlexW1977408311MaRDI QIDQ1939513

Markus Kinateder

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1261063683_WP_UNAV_18_09.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamefolk theoremdelayed perfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network

Cites Work

• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games