An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
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Publication:1939517
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0311-9zbMath1282.91233OpenAlexW2095165028WikidataQ57428130 ScholiaQ57428130MaRDI QIDQ1939517
Publication date: 4 March 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0311-9
Related Items (19)
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics ⋮ Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ New axioms for immediate acceptance ⋮ Characterizations of the cumulative offer process ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ The modified Boston mechanism
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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