Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0331-0zbMath1282.91050OpenAlexW2163437072MaRDI QIDQ1939518

Mathias Staudigl

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/14737

zbMATH Keywords

large deviationspotential gamesnetwork evolutionheterogeneous populationsinhomogeneous random graphs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Random graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C80) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks, Potential games in volatile environments, Evolution of social networks, A dynamic network model with persistent links and node-specific latent variables, with an application to the interbank market, Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games

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