Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0318-xzbMath1282.91036OpenAlexW2057018032MaRDI QIDQ1939520

Koji Takamiya

Publication date: 4 March 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessstrict core stabilitycoalition formation problemscoalitional unanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

Cites Work

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• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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