Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
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Publication:1939524
DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0326-XzbMath1282.90050OpenAlexW2117864369MaRDI QIDQ1939524
Publication date: 4 March 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0326-x
Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
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