The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.09.002zbMath1347.91181OpenAlexW2019220239MaRDI QIDQ1940384

Claude Fluet, Marie-Cécile Fagart

Publication date: 6 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003602dd

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelinformation systemmoral hazardcontractnonseparable utilitypecuniary effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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