A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals
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Publication:1941238
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.004zbMath1262.91034OpenAlexW2158628190MaRDI QIDQ1941238
Publication date: 12 March 2013
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/rails/active_storage/blobs/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBEdz09IiwiZXhwIjpudWxsLCJwdXIiOiJibG9iX2lkIn19--ddee7debf887937867019e6b16ebe63cac70fa65/12-2.pdf
Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Logic and Game Theory ⋮ A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
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