A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004zbMath1269.91005OpenAlexW2163792026MaRDI QIDQ1941240

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 12 March 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcommitmentcontractBayesian gameincentive compatibilityinterim individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

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