Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.12.002zbMath1258.91049OpenAlexW3023107922MaRDI QIDQ1941244

Nicolas Jacquemet, Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 12 March 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00773412/file/0-sum-expeWP.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationzero-sum repeated gameslaboratory experimentsconcealment of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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