Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0678-7zbMath1282.91181OpenAlexW2138096012MaRDI QIDQ1941971

Adam Dominiak, Jean-Philippe Lefort

Publication date: 25 March 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0678-7

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationambiguitycommon knowledgeChoquet expected utilityneo-additive capacitiesagreement theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

Put-call parity and generalized neo-additive pricing rules ⋮ Piecewise linear rank-dependent utility ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity ⋮ Counterfactuals in ``agreeing to disagree type results ⋮ Piecewise additivity for non-expected utility

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