Large extensive form games

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0674-yzbMath1282.91040OpenAlexW1982320065MaRDI QIDQ1941979

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date: 25 March 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y

zbMATH Keywords

treesextensive form gamessequential decision theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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