Information revelation in competitive markets
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Publication:1941983
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0629-3zbMath1282.91183OpenAlexW1985877023MaRDI QIDQ1941983
Publication date: 25 March 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0629-3
Related Items (7)
Efficiency versus optimality in procurement ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity ⋮ Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition ⋮ Informational control and organizational design ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
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- Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
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