Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
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Publication:1941986
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0622-xzbMath1282.91140OpenAlexW2096973185MaRDI QIDQ1941986
Leonid Polishchuk, Alexander Tonis
Publication date: 25 March 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0622-x
Related Items (10)
Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach ⋮ Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses ⋮ Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests ⋮ Contests with dominant strategies ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs ⋮ Innovation contests with entry auction ⋮ Probabilistic procurement auctions ⋮ Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests
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