How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
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Publication:1942875
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.05.041zbMath1258.91085OpenAlexW1967094770MaRDI QIDQ1942875
Publication date: 14 March 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041
Related Items (3)
How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions ⋮ Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions ⋮ Nonparametric estimation of utility function in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Cites Work
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Optimal Auction Design
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