Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.020zbMath1258.91055OpenAlexW2083081793MaRDI QIDQ1942927

Lauren Nicole Merrill

Publication date: 14 March 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.020

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofCondorcetmajority winner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Cites Work

• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• A simple characterization of majority rule
• Social aggregators
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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