Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.002zbMath1268.91063OpenAlexW3123583007MaRDI QIDQ1943437

Xu Tan, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 20 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

informationcommitteesvotingdeliberationexpertsdisclosuresender-receiver

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

Expert advice to a voting body ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making ⋮ Information disclosure with many alternatives ⋮ Information transmission and voting

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