Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.007zbMath1282.91185OpenAlexW3124425006MaRDI QIDQ1943439

John B. Donaldson, Marc P. Giannoni, Natalia Gershun

Publication date: 20 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

delegationexecutive compensationindeterminacy and instability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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