Mechanism design without revenue equivalence

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.014zbMath1282.91123OpenAlexW2088546345MaRDI QIDQ1943441

Jeffrey C. Ely, Juan Carlos Carbajal

Publication date: 20 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.014

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyloss aversionpublic goodsrevenue maximizationincentive compatibilityrevenue equivalenceintegral monotonicitynon-contractible actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments ⋮ Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ Detecting profitable deviations ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games

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