Extremal incentive compatible transfers

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.012zbMath1282.91131OpenAlexW3125305924MaRDI QIDQ1943442

Matthias Messner, Nenad Kos

Publication date: 20 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:359

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designbudget balanceincentive compatibilityrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ Detecting profitable deviations ⋮ Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments ⋮ Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games

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