Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.12.009zbMath1282.91136OpenAlexW1975549609MaRDI QIDQ1943453

Jingfeng Lu, Lixin Ye

Publication date: 20 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinformation acquisitionentrymechanismstwo-stage auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert

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