The organization of expertise in the presence of communication

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0139-1zbMath1260.91141OpenAlexW3121593184MaRDI QIDQ1944864

Flavia Roldán

Publication date: 28 March 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0835-E.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformation acquisitionorganizationcollusionexpertise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• A Model of Expertise
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

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