An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1944867
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5zbMath1260.91114OpenAlexW1965583710MaRDI QIDQ1944867
Publication date: 28 March 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5
strategy-proofnessfair allocationequal treatment of equalssecond price auctionnon-quasilinear preference
Related Items (12)
Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry ⋮ Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Cites Work
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
- The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Housing markets with indivisibilities
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
This page was built for publication: An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
