An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5zbMath1260.91114OpenAlexW1965583710MaRDI QIDQ1944867

Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date: 28 March 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessfair allocationequal treatment of equalssecond price auctionnon-quasilinear preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry ⋮ Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

Cites Work

• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
• Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
• The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Housing markets with indivisibilities
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

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