Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
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Publication:1944868
DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0138-2zbMath1260.91086OpenAlexW2060342959MaRDI QIDQ1944868
Publication date: 28 March 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2
Related Items (2)
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
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