Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9319-2zbMath1273.91154OpenAlexW2051984260MaRDI QIDQ1945450

James W. Boudreau, Vicki Knoblauch

Publication date: 8 April 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9319-2

zbMATH Keywords

matchingprice of stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie

Cites Work

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