Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9300-0zbMath1276.91048OpenAlexW2756946407MaRDI QIDQ1945455

Herrade Igersheim

Publication date: 8 April 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9300-0

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceGibbard's paradoxindividual rightsSen's Paretian liberal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: a history of Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox ⋮ Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem

Cites Work

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• Alternative libertarian claims and Sen's paradox
• Liberal paradox and the voluntary exchange of rights-exercising
• Restricted Pareto and rights
• Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• Liberal Values and Independence
• On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims

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