Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
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Publication:1945835
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016zbMath1275.91080OpenAlexW2093822473MaRDI QIDQ1945835
Rahmi İlkılıç, Olivier Bochet, Hervé Moulin
Publication date: 17 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12866
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