The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty

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Publication:1949015

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007zbMath1282.91023OpenAlexW2085355629MaRDI QIDQ1949015

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 25 April 2013

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007




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