Ideology and endogenous constitutions

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9zbMath1279.91059OpenAlexW1990765258MaRDI QIDQ1950345

Alessandro Riboni

Publication date: 13 May 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7723

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulestrategic interactionsagenda-setting gameideological polarizationposition-taking preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10)

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Cites Work

• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• The market for protection and the origin of the state
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• When will a dictator be good?
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Voting on Majority Rules

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