Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2013.01.030zbMath1264.91064OpenAlexW2114559069WikidataQ60241690 ScholiaQ60241690MaRDI QIDQ1951556

Ingmar Weber, Paul Dütting, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date: 6 June 2013

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.01.030

zbMATH Keywords

latticemechanism designmatching marketsenvy freenessdiscontinuous utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods ⋮ Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited

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