Market structure and matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.001zbMath1245.91072OpenAlexW1997697114MaRDI QIDQ1958951

Alexander Westkamp

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38801

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyacyclicitycorematching with contractsnetwork structuregroup stabilitychain stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (4)

Complexity of stability in trading networks ⋮ Market structure and matching with contracts ⋮ Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching ⋮ On stable matchings and flows

Cites Work

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• Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

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