The roommates problem revisited

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.003zbMath1245.91071OpenAlexW2017519965WikidataQ57439145 ScholiaQ57439145MaRDI QIDQ1958952

Thayer Morrill

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmarket designkidney exchangeEdmonds' blossom algorithmroommates problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (13)

Allocating group housing ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Unilateral stability in matching problems ⋮ A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms ⋮ Subgame perfect coalition formation ⋮ Pareto optimality in coalition formation ⋮ Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences ⋮ Exchange-stability in roommate problems ⋮ Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions ⋮ Price of Pareto optimality in hedonic games ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets

Cites Work

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• Pairwise kidney exchange
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• On cores and indivisibility
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Paths, Trees, and Flowers
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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