Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.004zbMath1244.91052OpenAlexW3122358595MaRDI QIDQ1958955

Philip H. Dybvig, Jun Yang, Nina Baranchuk

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractingrenegotiation-proofnesscompensation disclosureforward-looking announcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal

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