Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.002zbMath1245.91025OpenAlexW2167880988MaRDI QIDQ1958962

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2687

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgemaxmin expected utilityno-tradeinterim efficiencymultiple priors and posteriors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (8)

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Participation in risk sharing under ambiguity ⋮ Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity ⋮ On the confidence preferences model ⋮ Efficient allocations under ambiguity ⋮ Equilibria Under Knightian Price Uncertainty

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