The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries

DOI10.1007/S10614-010-9232-0zbMath1233.91207OpenAlexW2107651530WikidataQ57126309 ScholiaQ57126309MaRDI QIDQ1959114

Richard S. J. Tol, Dritan Osmani

Publication date: 6 October 2010

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/3d286f7c-fcb4-4716-bbb0-f4767b3e1ed8

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitynonlinear optimizationnon-cooperative game theoryself-enforcing international environmental agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (4)

Issue linkage ⋮ Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements ⋮ The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

Cites Work

• Equilibrium binding agreements
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

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