How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference

DOI10.1007/s10992-010-9136-4zbMath1246.03017OpenAlexW2153096006MaRDI QIDQ1959327

Philip Kremer

Publication date: 6 October 2010

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9136-4

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxtruthrevision theoryfixed-point semanticsvicious reference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items

Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth ⋮ Conditionals in theories of truth ⋮ Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference ⋮ Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth ⋮ Guest editors' introduction

Cites Work

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• Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth
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• Paradox without Self-Reference
• Outline of a Theory of Truth