Incentive compatible regression learning
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Publication:1959425
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2010.03.003zbMath1208.68132OpenAlexW1983916796MaRDI QIDQ1959425
Ofer Dekel, Ariel D. Procaccia, Felix Fischer
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1162/
Computational learning theory (68Q32) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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