Incentive compatible regression learning

DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2010.03.003zbMath1208.68132OpenAlexW1983916796MaRDI QIDQ1959425

Ofer Dekel, Ariel D. Procaccia, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1162/

zbMATH Keywords

regression analysiscomputational learning theoryalgorithmic mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational learning theory (68Q32) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (7)

Optimal Impartial Selection ⋮ A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games ⋮ GOODHART'S LAW AND MACHINE LEARNING: A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE ⋮ Algorithms for strategyproof classification ⋮ On incentive-compatible estimators ⋮ Regression markets and application to energy forecasting ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

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