The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0449-6zbMath1232.91191OpenAlexW2092928642WikidataQ114018209 ScholiaQ114018209MaRDI QIDQ1959697

Thomas Senné, Issofa Moyouwou, Boniface Mbih, Sébastien Courtin

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0449-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

This page was built for publication: The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules