The stable roommates problem with choice functions
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Publication:1959722
DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9314-3zbMath1209.68368OpenAlexW2003268641MaRDI QIDQ1959722
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9314-3
Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10)
Related Items (3)
Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable and meta-stable contract networks ⋮ Matroidal Choice Functions
Cites Work
- A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
- On a lemma of Scarf.
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- On the stable \(b\)-matching polytope.
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- On a generalization of the stable roommates problem
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- A New Approach to Stable Matching Problems
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- The Core of an N Person Game
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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