A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
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Publication:1959733
DOI10.1007/s00453-010-9388-yzbMath1203.91206OpenAlexW1969897216MaRDI QIDQ1959733
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9388-y
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Combinatorial games (91A46) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites Work
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- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- On cores and indivisibility
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- The exchange-stable marriage problem
- Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
- A lattice fixed-point theorem with constraints
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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